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The President of the United States held a news conference on August
25, 1965. One of the most significant things he said was the following:
This morning I have just concluded a breakfast meeting with the
Cabinet and with the heads of Federal agencies and I am asking
each of them to immediately begin to introduce a very new and very
revolutionary system of planning and programming and budgeting
throughout the vast Federal Government, so that through the tools
of modern management the full promise of a finer life can be brought
to every American at the lowest possible cost.'
The era of program budgeting had begun for the entire federal
government. In effect what the President said was: "I want all de-
partment and agency heads to try to do what McNamara and Hitch
have been attempting in Defense since 1961."
Even in 1961 the basic concept of program budgeting was not new.
It had been proposed for the Department of Defense as early as 1953,2
and something akin to it had been used by the War Production Board
in World War II.' Its use in industry apparently dates back to at least
But in spite of this history, the President's announcement in the
Nom. Any views expressed in this paper are those of the author. They should
not be interpreted as reflecting the views of The RAND Corporation or the
official opinion or policy of any of its governmental or private research sponsors.
'New York Times, August 26, 1965.
2DavidNovick, Efficiency and Economy in Government Through New Bud-
geting and Accounting Procedures, R-254, Santa Monica, Cal., 1953.
David Novick (ed), Program Budgeting: Program Analysis and the Federal
Budget, Cambridge, Mass., 2nd ed., 1967, pp. xvi—xix.
'Ibid., pp. xxi—xxii.
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summer of 1965 did pose something of a "revolution" for many depart-
ments and agencies in the federal government. In terms of the ultimate
goal, planning, programming and budgeting would have to become an
integrated process—something which (surprisingly) was not generally
true at that time. The "pure requirements" approach to planning would
have to be modified. Staunch advocates of new programs could no
longer argue effectivelyin terms of: "We need new program X
because there is a requirement for it; there is a requirement because
we need it"; and so on.
In the planning process, alternatives would have to be examined
systematically, subject to realistic resource constraints. And alternative
programs under consideration would have to be "costed out" to reflect
their complete incremental resource impact for the long-term future—
not merely the "down payment" as portrayed by next fiscal year's con-
ventional budget.
All of this sounds commonsensical enough. Itisbasically very
similar to what economic planners have been talking about for years.
In its simplest terms, program budgeting is primarily the identification
and systematic examination of objectives and the alternative ways of
achieving them. The main focus is on output-oriented programs or
"packages of public product," not the input orientation of the conven-
tional budget, which stresses personnel, equipment, facilities, trans-
portation, travel, contractual services, and the like.
In terms of the current jargon, the very heart of program budgeting
is contained in the expression "systems analysis." While systems analy-
sis cannot be defined with precision, the following would probably be
accepted as a reasonably adequate description by most of the practi-
tioners today:
Systems analysis may be defined as inquiry to assist decision-makers
in choosing preferred future courses of action by (1) systematically
examining and re-examining the relevant objectives and the alternative
policies or strategies for achieving them; and (2)comparingquanti-
tatively where possible the economic costs, effectiveness (benefits),
and risks of the alternatives. Itis more a research strategy than a
method or technique, and in its present state of development it is more
an art than a science. In sum, systems analysis may be viewed as an
approach to, or way of looking at, complex problems of choice under
conditions of uncertainty.5
5Fora further discussion of systems analysis, see E. S. Quade and W. I.
Boucher, Systems Analysis and Policy Planning: Applications in Defense, New
York, 1968, Chapter I.
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The foregoing provides the necessary frame of reference for the
discussion of the main subject of this paper: "Cost Functions and
Budgets." Perhaps in view of such a framework a more descriptive title
would be "Cost Considerations in Systems Analysis." In any event, the
latter is the perspective we shall stress.
The Key Issues
In discussing cost analysis as a part of systems analysis, it appears
that we can segregate the main issues into two categories:
1. The conceptual problems.
2. The practical problems involved in establishing cost analysis
capabilities in the federal government and elsewhere.
Both of these are important. But at the present time there appears
to be a special interest and sense of urgency regarding the second
category. We shall therefore stress practical problems in this paper.
Before turning to such a discussion, however, let us outline briefly some
of the characteristics of the necessary conceptual framework for a cost
analysis capability to support systems analysis studies.
The Conceptual Framework
in large measure the basic concepts underlying systems (program)
cost analysis draw very heavily on concepts taken from economic
theory and analysis.
A representative, but far from complete, listing of these basic con-
cepts is as follows:6
1. An explicit relationship between inputs and outputs, with a
strong emphasis on output-oriented identifications.
2. A strong emphasis on economic (not accounting) costs. Funda-
mentally this means the concept of opportunity cost.
6Theordering in no way reflects relative importance. Also, many of the items
are interrelated. Finally, in some instances it is not clear that the particular point
being made is conceptual or methodological—a distinction that is very often
difficult to make.234 The Analysis of Public Output
3. As a further elaboration of (2) is the requirement to deal with
such concepts as:
a. Marginal or incremental (and hence "sunk") costs.
b. Fixed and variable costs.
c. Recurring and nonrecurring costs.
d. Joint costs.
4. Explicittreatment of uncertainty.Simple"expected value"
models very often will not suffice.
5. An awareness of scaling considerations. As in economic theory,
many problems dealt with in systems cost analyses do not scale
up or down in a simple fashion.
6. Explicit treatment of problems associated with time—e.g., the
problem of time preference.
7. A strong emphasis on comparative analyses of alternatives—
e.g., fixed cost (budget) comparisons and/or fixed utility (effec- t
tiveness) comparisons.
8. A recognition of the importance of sensitivity analysis, contin-
gency analysis, a fortiori argument, and the identification of new
alternatives as ways of assisting in the all important search for
dominances.7
These eight points represent some of the most important charac-
teristics of the conceptual framework for cost analysis in support of
systems analysis studies. From a purely conceptual point of view,
there would seem to be little room for argument about the relevance
of these concepts. The main issues arise when the cost analysts try to
implement the basic ideas. Let us consider two examples briefly.
Most analysts agree that in principle the matter of time preference
should be treated explicitly. The disagreement arises over how this
should be done—for example, what discount rate seems most appro-
priate for equalizing cost streams over time. Numerous seminars and
4
conferences have been held on the subject of discounting, and the issue
isstill unresolved.8 Many analysts feel that it cannot be completely
7 Perhaps this point is more methodological than it is conceptual. We include
it in the list anyway, because of its central importance in systems analysis. (Also,
itis strongly related to (4)—explicit treatment of uncertainty.)
8 Recently a survey was made of 23 federal agencies to obtain information r
on discounting techniques used in making evaluations of future government
programs. One of the results is that the rates used vary from about 3 to 12 per
cent. See statement by Elmer B. Staats, Comptroller General of the United
States, before the Subcommittee on Economy in the Government, Congressional
Record—Senate, January 30, 1968, pp. S632—S634.F
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resolved and that in most instances the matter is less consequential
than many of the other cost analysis problems.
In fact, the analyst can do a great deal to sharpen the intuition and
judgment of the decision makers° without resolving the rate issue.
For one thing, the analyst can point out to the decision makers that
an "undiscounted" situation usually does not exist. A case in point
occurs in the Department of Defense where cost streams are projected
10 or 15 years into the future "without equalizing them for time
preference." Here, the analyst can make the time preference assump-
tion explicit: namely, a zero per cent discount rate for 10 or 15 years
and a very high rate thereafter. He can also calculate cases built on a
reasonable range of time preference assumptions and show the impact
on final results (the ranking of the alternatives being considered).
Finally, he can compute the "break-even point"—i.e., the case con-
taining that discount rate which would have to be used to make the
present value of two alternatives equal.
As a second illustration, let us consider the concept of opportunity
cost. Again, there would seem to be little argument about the concept
itself. Opportunity costs are generally recognized as being relevant in
the examination and evaluation of alternative future courses of action.
They are certainly much more relevant than, say, accounting-type costs
generated for fiduciary financial management purposes.
Problems arise, however, when the analysts attempt to apply the
concept of opportunity cost in systems analysis studies. For example,
e the cost analysts often generate estimates of the dollar costs of various
program or system alternatives being considered in long-range plan-
ning deliberations.'0 Such estimates may be expressed in terms of time-
e phased expenditures and/or obligational authority, or in terms of
is "static" indexes of total system or program cost." The specific issue is:
Do these dollar cost estimates adequately reflect the opportunity costs
d (benefits foregone) of the alternatives being examined—at least for
Le the purposes of the types of comparisons made in systems analyses?
ly They probably are not in all cases. However, most of the experts
seem to think that for the purposes of comparing distant future alter-
natives, dollar costs do provide a reasonably appropriate index of
To sharpen the intuition and judgment of the decision makers is the primary
role of systems analysis. Generally speaking, an analysis cannot makethedcci-
sion (e.g., see A. C. Enthoven's statement contained in an article in Business
er Week, November 13, 1965, p. 189).
Othermeasures of cost are also calculated—e.g., manpower.
411 iiThatis,the sum of development (if any) and investment costs plus a
number of years operating cost.
Jr
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opportunity costs in many applications. This point of view is argued
vigorously, and rather convincingly, in the context of Department of
Defense planning by Hitch and McKean:
If we examine the problem of planning future programs from the
standpoint of the Defense Department, it seems fairly obvious that t
money costs are pertinent. The Department faces a budgetary con-
straint. For the most part it does not face a limitation on particular
weapons or supplies but can buy more of them by paying their prices.
What does the Department give up in order to implement one course
of action? The answer is money—or, to go one step further, the
alternative weapons or supplies that could otherwise be purchased.
The Department could substitute one item for another by paying the
price of the one instead of paying the price of the other. Dollar costs
do reflect what must be given up in order to adopt a particular policy.
They reflect real sacrifices by the Department because the prices of
different items show the rates at which they can be substituted for
each other.
This is not to say that money costs perfectly represent resources
sacrificed by the Defense Department. The prices of goods to be
bought in the future are uncertain. One course of action may itself
drive up the price of particular weapons or materials, and it is not
possible to predict these effects with complete accuracy. The charac-
teristics and cost of some items will change as technology advances.
The quantity of some exceptional items may literally be fixed, or
nearly fixed, even if we are looking several years ahead. Nonetheless,
imperfect as it is, the money cost of a future program usually shows
the sacrifice that would be required of the Department better than
other measures of cost. While dollars do not precisely measure the
real sacrifices, Costs in terms of metals and manpower would be
grossly misleading. Saying that airplanes cost so much aluminum
and ships so much steel plate does not tell us how one may be ex-
changed fortheother. Saying that each costs so many dollars
adheres more closely to the facts, namely, that the services can, in
making future plans, trade one for the
5?CharlesJ. Hitch and Roland N. McKean, TheEconomicsof Defense in the
NuclearAge, Cambridge, Mass., 1960, p. 26.
The above quotation is concerned with dollars as a proximate measure of
economic cost from the viewpoint of the Department of Defense. What about
from the standpoint of the nation? Hitch and McKean consider this question,
and argue the case by means of an illustrative example (see pp. 27—28).
Their general conclusion is:
As a consequence, money costs of futuredefenseactivities approximate the
real alternatives that are foregone—the real sacrifices that are entailed—
when one activity or weapon system is selected. This will be true for those
problems in which a general monetary constraint is proper, that is,for
AI
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Our concern in this paper is' not so much with whether Hitch and
McKean are correct. Rather the point is that the issue under considera-
tion pertains more to the matter of implementation of a concept rather
than to the relevance of the concept itself. It is generally recognized
that economic cost is one of the relevant considerations to be taken
into account in systems analysis studies. The question is how to do
it in practice.
This leads to our next subject: cost analysis in support of systems
analysis in practice. How is it done? What are some of the problems?
Cost Analysis in Practice
In general terms the central problem facing cost analysts is to develop
methods and techniques which will permit assessment of the resource
impact of proposedalternativeoutput-oriented programs and/or
alternative combinations (mixes) of future programs.
The basic characteristics of such a cost analysis capability stem
directly from the conceptual framework discussed in the preceding
section. A few of the more important of these characteristics are as
follows:
1. While most of the basic estimating work must be done on the
input side in terms of manpower, equipment, facilities, supplies,
etc., the results of a cost analysis must be packaged in the form
of output-oriented entities which are of prime concern to the long-
range planning decision makers.
2. Cost analysis procedures (models) must be "open-ended" with
respect to key performance and other variables which charac-
terize the class of output-oriented entities under consideration.
This facilitates doing parametric-type analyses which are of prime
importance in extending the range of alternatives that can be
examined, in making a fortiori arguments, in making sensitivity
tests, in exploring scaling factors, and the like.
3. Related to (2)is the requirement to deal explicitly with the
problem of uncertainty. Parametric cost models help by facili-
• tating the computation of a range of cost estimates (rather than
• "point" estimates alone),'3 and by permitting determination of
problemspertainingto dates sufficiently in the future to permit the produc-
• tion and procurement of varying quantitiesof weapons and materiel
(ibid.,p.28).
13For example, "high," "medium" and "low" cases.
-kr
238 The Analysis of Public Output
the sensitivity of total system or program cost to variations in
the values of key parameters about which we are uncertain.
4. Both (2) and (3) imply the need for cost analysis models which
are in part automated. If a large number of cases are to be com-
puted within a reasonable amount of time and effort, manual
calculation alone is usually out of the question.'4
5. A strong emphasis must be placed on developing cost analysis
procedures which will permit assessment of incremental costs—
i.e., the additional costs implied by the proposed future course of
action under consideration. The costs of past actions ("sunk"
costs) and the costs of firmly committed ("locked-in") future
actions must be excluded.
6. Finally—and perhaps most important of all—a substantial
amount of time and effort must be devoted to the continuous
development and maintenance of an appropriate data base: i.e.,
information on past, current and near future programs to serve
as a basis for the derivation of estimating relationships to be used
in projecting to the distant future.
We have stressed the prime importance of "output-oriented entities"
or "program packages." What does this mean in areas of specific
application? In the case of the Department of Defense these entities
are by now rather widely recognized as being weapon and support
systems and force mixes of such systems. What about the nonmilitary
realm? The following are a few examples.
In the transportation area output-oriented entities may be various
future modes of transportation—rail systems (surface and subsurface),
"automated" freeway systems, airlift systems, etc., and mixes of these
modes. In the mental health area the planners may be interested in
such things as alternative systems for dispensing mental health services
(e.g., community mental health centers), alternative programs for
narcotic and drug abuse, etc. In the National Aeronautics and Space a
Administration the prime concern is with alternative ways of attaining b
certain goals in space—e.g., alternative space systems for performing
future missions in the lunar, earth-orbital, and planetary areas.
In any event, the cost analyst must be able to conduct his studies g
in terms of the types of identifications or "planning units" that are of
"In some instances a tremendous number of individual calculationsare
required for a single case. For example, the total force structure cost model
developed by The RAND Corporation toassess the resource impact of a
projected total Air Force plan over a 10-year period makes about 500,000 com-
putations for the typical single case.I
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FIGURE 1
SYSTEM COST VERSUS PROGRAM SIZE
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primary interest to the long-range planners. This is just as true in
nonnational security problem areas as it is in defense, and the basic
problems are very similar.
Let us now consider a few hypothetical examples to illustrate some
of the types of output from the cost analysis process which are useful
in systems analysis. In these illustrations the "output-oriented entities"
are assumed to be alternative system or program package proposals
g being considered in the long-range planning process.
g A very useful output of the cost analysis process (an input to sys-
tems analysis) is a cost function relating projected total system (pro-
gram) cost55 to the size (cumulative number of units) of a proposed
future course of action. An example is shown in Figure 1. Here, total
15Here,total system (program) cost is defined as development (if any) plus
initial investment plus a fixed number of future years' operating cost. Oftentimes
a the number of years' operation istreated parametrically to see whether the










NOTE: Based on total
contained in Figure 1.
development, investment, and five-year operation curve
system cost is increasing at a decreasing rate, and hence marginal cost
(the cost of an additional unit) is a decreasing function of the cumu-
lative number of units. This is portrayed in Figure 2.
Cost functions expressing total system cost as a function of cumula-
tive number of units are particularly useful in a fixed budget com-
parative framework of analysis. Here, the systems analyst often wants
to know: "How many units of the various alternatives under considera-
tion can I get out of certain stipulated future budget levels?"6
An example is presented in Figure 3 for alternatives A and B. If
Thisis one example of why cost functions relating cost to the scale of pro.
posed future programs are useful in systems analysis work.
Many of the cost functions emphasized in conventional economic theory relate
cost to rate of output. Rate-of-output cost functions are also useful in certain
types of problems in systems analysis. For example, in studying alternative con-
figurations of proposed community mental health centers, we might want to
examine how unit costs change as daily out-patient capacity rate is varied over
a relevant range. In the case of military aircraft systems the analyst often
examines how system cost (for a fixed force size) changes as the activity rate
(e.g., flying hours per aircraft per month) is varied over a certain range.
-j A
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FiGURE 3
TOTAL SYSTEM COST VERSUS PROGRAM SIZE
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thespecified cost level to be used in the comparative analysis is $8
billion, 11.5 units of alternative A or 7 units of alternative B are
obtainable. This is a key output of the cost analysis, which then be-
comes a major input to the effectiveness (utility) analysis.
Notice that in this illustration the results do not scale linearly with
respect to changes in the stipulated cost level. For example, if L1 is
increased by 50 per cent to L2 =$12billion, the outcome is 22 units
of A or 12 units of B. The increase in the number of units is greater




In a simple way this demonstrates that in the context of a fixed
budget framework ofanalysis,scaling considerations suggest the
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level. For example, three cases might be examined: high, medium, and
low.
To illustrate a somewhat different point, let us now consider a fixed
effectiveness framework of analysis for comparing alternative pro-
posed future courses of action. Here, the analysis attempts to determine
that possibility(or feasible combination of possibilities) which is
likely to achieve some specified level of effectiveness at the lowest
economic cost. The cost analysis in effect produces the final results
after the effectiveness analysis has determined how much of each
alternativeis required to attain the stipulated level of effectiveness.
As one simple illustration of this approach, suppose that alterna-
tives C and D are under consideration, and that the results of the
effectiveness analysis indicate the following ranges of quantities (num-




Expected value 22 6
High 2412
Notice that in this case the range for D is considerably greater than
for C because of uncertainty.
Suppose now that the estimated total system costs as a function of
cumulative number of units for C and D are as shown in Figure 4.
Taking the expected value outputs from the effectiveness analysis, we
see from Figure 4 that D is the least cost alternative for attaining
effectiveness level E0: $7.5 billion for D vs. $15.3 billion for C, or a
factor-of-two difference in favor of D. If the uncertainties in the effec-
tiveness analysis are taken into account, alternative D still holds up
well, even in the situation where the worst case (highest cost) for D
and the best case (lowest cost) for C are paired up. Thus, at least
with respect to the uncertainties taken into account in the problem,
alternative D appears to be a dominant solution—something which
the systems analyst is always seeking, but rarely finds.
So far, our examples have been essentially "static," i.e., projected
costs have not been treated explicitly as a function of time. In many
decision contexts, however, the alternatives have to be examined in
terms of time-phased cost streams projected a number of years into
the future.
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FIGURE 4
TOTAL SYSTEM COST VERSUS PROGRAM SIZE
FOR ALTERNATIVES CANDD
programs E and F, which are estimated to be capable of accomplish-
ing the same objective in the future with essentially the same degree of
effectiveness for the time period of interest (a "fixed-effectiveness-
over-time" framework of analysis). Suppose further that the time-
phased total program costs over a 15-year period in the future are as
portrayed in Figure 5. Here, the time preference assumption is a zero
discount rate for the first 15 years, and a very high rate (over 100
per cent) thereafter. Notice that in each case when the yearly costs
are summed over the 15-year period, the totals are the same ($9 billion
each for E and F).
On the basis of the data presented so far, we have an equal-effective-
ness, equal-cost situation; so presumably the decision makers would
be indifferent regarding the choice of E or F—at least on the basis of
the quantitative information available at this point.
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FIGURE 5
TIME-PHASED PROGRAM COSTS FOR ALTERNATIVES
E AND F
(DIscouNTED FOR TIME PREFERENCE AT 0.0 PER CENT FOR. THE
FIRST FIFTEEN YEARS, 100+ PER CENT THEREAFTER),
Notice, however, that the time impacts of the costs for E and F are
considerably different. The basic reason for the differenceisthat
alternative E requires higher cost outlays (relative to F) early in the
period because of greater development and investment costs. These
outlays pay off in terms of an efficient operational program having
relatively low operating costs later in the period. Alternative F, on the
other hand, has lower development and investment costs than E. This,
however, implies a less efficient operational program than E, with
r
A
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the result that larger operating costs are required to accomplish the
specified task with the same degree of effectiveness as E. Therefore,
the costs for F during the latter years of the 15-year period are about
two times those of E.
In view of these differences in the time impact of the costs of E and
F, the question arises as towhether the planners would still be indiffer-
ent regarding the choice of E or F if the time preference assumptions
are varied. Suppose the base case (Figure 5) is modified to reflect the
following time preference specifications: a discount rate of 6 per cent
for 15 years,, and a very high rate (over 100 per cent) thereafter.
The results are as follows:
Present Value in Billions of Dollars
Base Case First Modification
(0; 100+%) (6; 100+%)a
Alternative E $9 $5.8
Alternative F 9 5.3
Difference 0 0.5
aThetime-phased cost profiles for this case are presented in Figure 6.
Thus, the first modification (6 per cent for the first 15 years) results
in a rather sharp reduction in the present value of the 15-year costs for
both E and F. However, the difference between them can hardly be
regarded as significant in view of the many uncertainties involved in
the total analysis. The decision makers are likely to continue to be
indifferent regarding the choice of E or F on the basis of the present
values of the two cost streams.
Would this still be the case for a discount rate considerably higher
than 6 per cent? Let us try a 10 per cent rate for 15 years, and a very
high rate (over 100 per cent) thereafter. The results are:
Present Value in Billions of Dollars
Base Case First Mod. Second Mod.
(0; I00+%)(6; 100+%)(10; l00+%)
Alternative E $9 $5.8 $4.5
Alternative F 9 5.3 3.9
Difference 0 0.5 0.6
The second modification results in a further reduction in the present
values of the fifteen-year costs for both E and F. Here again it is very
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FIGURE 6
TIME-PHASED PROGRAM COST FOR ALTERNATIVES E AND F
(DISCOUNTED FOR TIME PREFERENCE AT 6 PER CENT FOR TEE












doubtful that the difference in present values between E and F is
significant. The uncertainties in the basic problem are such that a
15 per cent difference in cost is no doubt well within the "noise level"
of the analysis. Also, it should be pointed out that in most contexts a
10 per cent discount rate for time preference is fairly high,'7 which
makes the second modification a rather extreme case.
17Recallthat in this exercise we have been discounting for time preference
only—not for time preference plus a supplemental rate for risk. When analysts
apply rates like 10 to 15 per cent, they usually have in mind a combined rate
to allow for time preference and risk or uncertainty.
I
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In sum, in this particular example, the conclusion would seem to
be that the decision regarding the choice of alternative E or F is likely
to be independent of the assumptions made with respect to the treat-
ment of time
As a final example, let us consider the examination of variations in
total system (program) cost as the characteristics of the system (pro-
gram) are varied, assuming a fixed number of years of operation. This
is an important technique of analysis in systems analysis.
For an illustration, we shall use the context of the national security
area and consider the case of a proposed future aircraft system where
the mission requires that a fleet of aircraft be continuously airborne
on a series of stations which cover a large geographical area. A Navy
antisubmarine warfare (ASW) mission in the futureisa possible
example.
Continuously airborne alert aircraft systems typically involve a host
of significant variables: endurance hours of the aircraft to be employed
in the system, extent of the area coverage, nature of the payload re-
quirements, aircraft maintenance policy (one, two, or three shifts),
and the like. Intrasystem cost analysis must usually explore the con-
sequences of variations in these variables.
Figure 7 shows an example for a future ASW system to patrol and
destroy ballistic missile carrying enemy submarines, where aircraft
endurance hours and area coverage (nautical miles out to sea from
U.S. coastlines) are varied. Here total system cost is defined to be
research and development + investment + five years of operation.
Notice that as the area coverage is extended, the requirement for
longer endurance becomes increasingly more severe.
Figure 8 contains another ASW system cost example. Here total
system cost (defined as in Figure 7) for each pound of payload (elec-
18Examplesof other cases are the following:
Present Value in Billions of Dollars
Case
Alt. E Alt. FDifference
6% for 25 yrs. $6.9 $7.4 $0.5
10% for 25 yrs. 5.0 4.9 0.1
15% for 25 yrs. 3.5 3.1 0.4
5% for first10 yrs.
10% for next 5 yrs.
6 6 20% for next 5 yrs. 0.1
50% for next 5 yrs.
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FIGURE 7
COST VERSUS AIRCRAFT ENDURANCE FOR
SEVERAL AREA COVERAGES
•1
tronics, ASW missiles, etc.) on station is expressed as a function of
the pounds of payload carried per aircraft.'9 Curves are shown for
three types of aircraft that might be candidates for use in the proposed
ASW system.
Notice that the use of conventional jets in this mission application
results in a considerably higher minimum cost point than for long-
endurance aircraft, and that system cost per pound of payload on
station is very sensitive to individual aircraft payload weight. Note
also that as we move to the large, long-endurance aircraft, the costs
become much less sensitive to a particular loading or payload weight.
This might suggest that if the size of the payload to perform the future
mission is clouded by uncertainties, then flexibility may be achieved
by going to the large, long-endurance aircraft.
19Areacoverage is fixed at 1,000 nautical miles.
A
Area coverage extending
nauticalmiles Out to sea
Area coverage extending 1000 nautical miles
12
Area coverage extending 500 nautical mites
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FIGURE 8
SYSTEM COST PER POUND OF PAYLOAD ON STATION
























NOTE: Area coverage =1,000 nauticalmiles.
A Major Difficulty: The Data Problem
What are the main difficulties involved in doing cost analyses of the
type described in the previous section? There are many—some bureau-
cratic, some substantive. Because of space limitations, all of these
difficulties cannot be outlined and discussed here. We shall therefore
take the most severe—the data problem—and treat it at some length.2°
In most cases the ability to engage in cost analysis as an integral
part of systems analysis studies requires the development and use of
20Muchof the discussion to follow draws rather heavily on the national secur-
ity area. This is because the author has had more experience in the Department
of Defense than in other governmental agencies. The basic data problems, how-
ever, are very similar in all areas, and the methodological and procedural points
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cost models. A cost model is a device for generating estimates of the
resource impact of future output-oriented program packages in terms
of the inputs that would be required to develop, install, and operate
these proposed programs over a period of years. The input structure
typically involves various categories of facilities, equipment, personnel,
supplies, etc., or combinations of these items (maintenance, for ex-
ample).
For each category in the input structure we must have an estimating
relationship (or series of relationships) expressing cost as a function
of an appropriate set of cost-generating or explanatory variables.2'
These estimating relationships form the very heart of a cost analysis
capability.
Estimating relationships have to be derived on the basis of some-
thing. Sometimes that something has to be "experience and judgment"
(preferably of an expert)Generally speaking, however, we would
prefer that they be developed from statistical analyses of past, current,
and near-future data and information. At this point we run headlong
into "the data problem." And it is a problem of fundamental impor-
tance, because a substantive cost analysis capability cannot exist with-
out an appropriate information and data bank.
Why Is There a Data Problem?
The reader may well wonder why the data problem is so severe. Has
not the Government been developing information systems and collect-
ing a huge volume of data in numerous areas for many years? Have not
industry and other institutions been doing the same thing? How could
there be a "data problem"?
These are legitimate questions. The answers are numerous and var-
ied. Here, we shall try to select a few of the more important ones,
with a view to giving the reader a reasonable degree of understanding
of why a data problem exists.22
21 The cost of a certain type of equipment for the future may be estimated as
a function ofits performance and/or physical characteristics and estimated
production quantity. The cost of equipment maintenance may be estimated as a
function of equipment characteristics and projected activity rate.
22 The points discussed below relate for the most part to technical aspects of
the problem. Other factors can be important also. For example, formal informa-
tion and data systems are sometimes established without sufficient understanding
of the relevant organizational and institutional considerations pertaining to the
agency in question.
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INFORMATION IN THE WRONG FORMAT. Information systems in
the Government and elsewhere have indeed generated a tremendous
amount of data. In many instances, however, these data are not in an
appropriate format to be very useful in a program cost analysis activity
serving the long-range planning process.
The main reason for this is that these information systems were
established primarily to serve the needs of managers of functional areas
of operationalactivity(maintenance, supply,etc.),of managers
responsible for fiscal integrity or fiduciary accounting requirements
("keeping hands out of the till"), of managers concerned with critical
resource items across the board (e.g., personnel), of budgeteers con-
cerned with the conventional budget, and the like. In short, the orienta-
tion of a large number of past and existing information systems is
toward the input side per se, with little or no provision for making
meaningful translations reflecting impacts on output-oriented program
packages.28
THE "MATCHING UP" OR INTEGRATION PROBLEM. The analyst
must not only collect historical cost data in the right format, par-
ticularly when the objective is to derive estimating relationships. He
must also obtain information on quantities, physical and performance
characteristics, activity rates, and other types of cost-generating vari-
ables. The latter must be matched specifically to the cost data points.
Sometimes thisisdifficult because the information on the cost-
generating variables must be extracted from different sets of records
than those containing the cost data. And differing sets of records can
often have dissimilar bases for reporting—for example, with respect
to lot size, time period covered, and the like.
DIFFERENCES IN DEFINITIONS OF CATEGORIES. A different
kind of "matching up" problem frequently occurs. This concerns the
lack of a one-to-one correspondence between the definition of the
content of categories in the input structures set up for program cost
analysis purposes, and the definition of analogous categories in the
existing data and information collection systems.
23Oftentimesthe suggestion is made that if the analyst will probe the data
base at successively greater levels of detail, he will eventually find the kinds of
identifications he needs. Sometimes this is true. On the other hand, one is likely
to find that if an information system is structured to deal in terms of, say, "object
classes," then going into more detail will simply yield greater amounts of infor-
mation in the same terms (object classes).
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It is not possible to set up the preferred input structure which will
meet the requirements of cost analyses in support of long-range
planning and at the same time be in complete harmony with existing
data and information systems at any point in time. Differences in
definition of certain categories in the input structure and their counter-
parts in the existing data base are therefore bound to be present. This
creates a data problem for the cost analyst when he is collecting
information to serve as the basis for deriving estimating relationships
for various categories and subcategories in his input structure. He
will often have to make adjustments to the raw data to correct for
these definitional differences.
THE INFLUENCE OF TEMPORAL FACTORS. Historical data are,
of course, generated over time. This means that numerous dynamic
factors will have influences on the information being collected in a
certain area. First of all, the information collection systems them-
selves have a habit of changing over time—for example, the appro-
priate definition of the content of various categories being used to
accumulate the historical data may change as the system evolves.
Also, in the case of financial data, price level changes will occur and
be reflected in the information being collected over time.
In addition to these types of temporal considerations is the impor-
tant fact that many government agencies deal with a rapidly changing
technology, both with respect to hardware and with respect to organi-
zational and operational concepts. Almost by definition, this means
that even with a near perfect information collection system, only a
relatively small sample of data can be generated for a given era or
class of technology. In the major equipment area, for example, the
analyst is lucky if he can have available 15 or 20 good data points for
a certain class of hardware. He is more likely to have less than half
that number.
By the nature of things, therefore, the analyst is all too often in the
world of very small samples. As all good statisticians know, this poses
real problems in our attempts to develop meaningful structural rela-
tionships which will permit us to project forward to distant future
programs and capabilities.
So much for our listing of problem areas concerning the data base.
We repeat that the four points outlined above do not represent a
complete enumeration; they should, however, convince the reader that
there is such a thing as a "data problem." The question now is: What
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Dealing with the Data Problem
At first thought, one might be tempted to say: "If there is a data
problem, let's solve it once-and-for-all by establishing the information
collection system to meet all our needs." People have often made
statements like this. Is such a thing feasible?
We think not, for several reasons. Some of the more important of
these are the following:
1. Cost analysis problems in support of systems analyses typically
vary considerably from one study to another. The requirements for
estimating relationships—and hence data and information require-
ments—are not constant over time, or even for a given small interval
of time. In short, the cost analyst who is working in support of the
long-range planning process could not specify his data and information
needs "once-and-for-all." It would be difficult, if not impossible, then,
to establish the comprehensive information system.
2. Even if something approaching (1) could be done, we still have
to worry about economics. Large information systems—especially
those designed for complete enumerations—are very expensive. This
poses a systems analysis problem in itself. Would the (large) incre-
mental cost of a new complete enumeration information system be
justified in terms of the benefits to be derived—particularly in the
context of long-range planning, where high precision in an absolute
sense is usually not a prime requirement? The answer is probably
"no.,,24
3. In addition to points (1) and (2) is the problem of small samples
arising from the fact that many government agencies have to deal with
a rapidly changing technology. As indicated previously, this means
that in many instances only a relatively small number of observations
will be available for a certain era or class of technology. Here, even a
near perfect information system cannot increase the sample size.
Where does all this leave us? On the one hand, a strong argument
has been advanced for the importance of an appropriate information
and data base. On the other hand, trying to solve the problem once
and for all does not seem feasible, at least in a general sense. Does
this mean that the situation is at an impasse?
24 As will be pointed out later, there are alternatives to complete enumerations
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The answer is"no." The problem issusceptible to reasonable
solution, at least in many instances. Numerous possible alternatives to
establishing new complete enumeration information systems may be
considered. We shall now outline and discuss briefly examples of a few
of the approaches that may be taken to help solve the data problem.
Use of Ad Hoc Sample Surveys
One very interesting possibility which the present author feels has
been relatively neglected is sampling, or something akin to sampling.
This can be a low cost way of obtaining information that may be very
useful in deriving estimating relationships for use in long-range planning
studies.
Suppose, for example, that the cost analyst is faced with the prob-
lem of developing end-product oriented estimating relationships for
some functional area like maintenance or supply in the Department of
Defense. Suppose further that the existing cost accounting systems
accumulate historical cost data in categories such as labor, material,
overhead, etc., and that no provision is made for identifications to
end-product packages of military capability (e.g., weapon systems).
Conceivably one solution would be to overhaul the entire formal
accounting system to accumulate historical cost data in the desired
form, in addition to the existing categories needed for purposes of
functional management of the maintenance and supply activities.
This, however, could be very expensive, and considerable time would
have to elapse to permit designing, testing, and implementing of the
new accounting system.
An alternative would be to select a few representative locations and
to provide for an ad hoc (temporary) "ticketing" system to accumu-
late costs in terms of weapon systems for a relatively short period of
time—say a month or two. The ad hoc arrangement would be supple-
mentary to—and hence would not disturb—theexistingformal
accounting system. This approach has been used on numerous occasions
in the past; and for those cases known to the author, the results have
been good—at least for the purpose of deriving estimating relation-
ships for long-range planning.25 In any event, sampling procedures
The author has conducted simple tests in several instances where complete
enumerations were available. The procedure was as follows: Take the complete
enumeration as a data base and, using regression analysis, derive an estimating
relationship—say C= +fiX. Then take random samples of 15 or 20 observa-
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seem worthy of consideration as an alternative to establishing new
complete enumeration systems across the board.
Techniques for Assisting in Handling the Small Sample Problem
We have pointed out that the cost analyst very often finds himself
confronted with small samples. Let us consider two examples to
demonstrate several things that can be done to help ease the problems
arising from having to use data bases containing only a small number
of observations from the historical record.
The first is an extremely simple idea, but in some instances it can
help a great deal. Particularly in deriving estimating relationships for
useinlong-range planningstudies,thecostanalyst should not
necessarily restrict himself to the historical record in assembling his
data base. In many cases he should seriously consider increasing the
number of observations by including appropriate data points based
on estimates made by experts for the very near future, and/or by tak-
ing advantage of certain kinds of qualitative information.
Suppose, for example, we have only four data points available from
the historical record (see Figure 9). Suppose further that the analyst
must derive an estimating relationship which will help him project out
beyond the range of the historical sample (beyond the value X0 of
the explanatory variable). On the basis of the four data points alone,
it is not very clear what kind of relationship between C and X should
be postulated. For example, the curves AB and CD in Figure 10
would seem about equally plausible. Here is a case where the cost
analyst should probe further and attempt to get some sort of additional
information (either quantitative or qualitative) to help him make an
informed judgment.
Suppose that in our hypothetical example the cost analyst, upon
further exploration, was fortunate enough to find two more data
points in the form of estimates for the near future made by reputable
experts in thefield under consideration. Upon checking out the
methods used to make these estimates, the cost analyst decided that it
would be appropriate for him to use them as a supplement to his his-
basis of these sample data bases. Then test the resulting estimates ofand fi
against the values obtained from the complete enumeration to see if there is a
significant difference. In the particular cases examined by the author, most of
the time no significant difference existed (at the 0.05 level) between estimates
of the regression coefficients obtained from the small samples and those obtained
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torical data base. The result is shown in Figure 11. This would tend
to suggest the appropriateness of a linear hypothesis as a basis for
projecting out to the vicinity of X1 in Figure 11.
Let us assume, however, that our cost analyst wanted still further
substantiation—if possible. He recalled that in his initial search for
an appropriate explanatory variable, he had talked to some engineers
who were experts in designing the type of equipment or activity under
investigation in this particular case. He decided to consult with them
again in the hope of obtaining some thread of qualitative evidence
which would help in deciding whether to accept or reject the linear
hypothesis. Upon listening to the engineers discuss the structural
characteristics of the activity under consideration, the cost analyst
became convinced that projections for large values of the explanatory
variable X should be made on the basis of a linear relationship
between C and X.
This hypothetical example illustrates two points about how one can
deal with very small samples: (1) Under certain conditions the size
of the sample can be increased by judiciously using estimates for the
near future as supplements to the historical data base; (2) it may be
FIGURE 11
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FIGURE 12
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possibleto use qualitative information to assist in deciding about what
kind of estimating relationship is most appropriate.
As another example, let us consider a case where the sample is
very small and we seek to gain additional information by lowering the
level of aggregation one notch.
In the area of military major equipment cost analysis, cost-quantity
relationships are very important. As the cumulative number of units
increases, unit cost usually declines.26 Suppose that we are interested
in a certain type of aircraft airframe (call it X) and that we have
only three data points. No other points are available for this particular
airframe. The log-log plot of the data base is shown in Figure 12.
26Fora thorough treatment of cost-quantity relationships, see Harold Asher,
Cost-Quantity Relationships in the Airframe Industry, R-29), Santa Monica, Cal.,
1956. Cost-quantity relationships in one form or another are also found in other
areas. For example, in the automobile industry unit production costs after launch-
ing a new model are considerably higher during the earlier part of the produc-
tion run than they are later in the model year. These "excess" costs are called
"launching costs" in the automobile industry.
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Assume now that the cost analysis is part of a systems analysis study
in which large numbers of airframe X are being considered: 1000 or
more. Should the analyst simply assume a log-linear relationship,
connect his three data points, and extend the line out to cumulative
outputs of 1000 or more? Most probably not. An experienced analyst
knows all too well the dangers of mechanistic extrapolation, for scaling
factor reasons and others as well.
Sincein our hypothetical example the sample size cannot be
increased, what can be done? One possibility is to see if additional
information can be obtained by disaggregating. Suppose that our cost
analyst goes back to the original data source and finds that additional
detail is in fact available. He obtains a breakdown of the total air-
frame in terms of labor, material, and overhead. A plot of these data
is shown in Figure 13. This slight addition to the data base imme-
diately provides useful insights into the projection problem. If we
assume log-linear relationships for the components (labor, material,
FIGURE 13
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and overhead) ,27 it is obvious that on the basis of the available infor-
mation the total curve cannot be log-linear when projected out to
large cumulative unit numbers because the materials curve has a
significantly different slope than the labor and overhead curves.28
If the curves in Figure 13 are extrapolated out to cumulative unit
number 1000, the results are as portrayed in Figure 14. Here itis
clear that the cost analyst has benefited from the information obtained
by disaggregating one level in the data base. Merely extrapolating out
to cumulative output 1000 on the basis of the three original data
points no longer seems appropriate.29 The difference between the two
2? In general this is not necessarily a good assumption; but we shall use it here
to keep the example simple. The argument is even stronger if the component
curves are assumed to be convex on logarithmic grids.
28 If the component curves are linear but nonparallel, the total curve (sum
of the components) must be convex on logarithmic grids and must approach as
a limit the flattest of the component curves (e.g., see Asher, op. cit.,pp.70—72).
29 The difference would be even greater if the component curves were assumed
to be convex.
A
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FIGURE 14
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curves increasesstillfurther for cumulative unit numbers beyond
This example illustrates how going into slightly more detail can
help in cases where the cost analyst has to work with a very small
sample. A word of caution is in order, however. The reader should
not generalize from our example and conclude that in all (or even
most) instances the assembly of a more and more detailed data base
will, in itself, make for better understanding of the problem.
The Use of Experiments to Broaden the Data Base
Sometimes the cost analyst finds that in a given problem area there is
simply a void in the existing formal data base. This is likely to be
the case when the planners are considering new proposals for distant
future programs or capabilities requiring major equipments and/or
operational concepts markedly different from those of the past and the
present.
In some instances the existing set of estimating relationships can
be used to conduct simulations which will furnish a first approximation
to the cost of these proposed new capabilities. In other instances,
however, the cost analyst cannot assume that the structural parameters
in the existing set of estimating relationships are appropriate for the
new activities being considered. He must therefore develop new rela-
tionships, or devise techniques for adjusting the present ones. But how
does he do this if the necessary data base does not yet exist? One
possibility is to see if any experiments are being conducted pertaining
to the subject at hand; and if not, to try to initiate such an experiment.
Let us consider one example briefly.
A number of years ago, cost analysts were confronted with the task
of estimating the cost of the first generation of proposed stainless
steel airframes for the mid-1960s. These proposals usually required
rather extensive use of stainless steel honeycomb paneling, the produc-
tion of which would involve a significant advance in the manufacturing
state of the art. The historical data base at that time was, of course,
confined almost entirely to the experience accumulated in producing
aluminum airframes, and little was in the formal records about the
fabrication costs of stainlesssteel honeycomb panels—particularly
large panels.
30The differenceis only about $1.50 per pound at cumulative unit num-
ber 1000. At cumulative output 5000, the difference between the linear projection
and the nonlinear total curve is about $3.00 per pound.262 The Analysis of Public Output
In the process of talking to the aerospace industry contractors
regarding the problems involved in fabricating stainless steel structures,
the cost analysts found that one of the companies was conducting a
rather elaborate experiment. A special shop had been set up and
numerous types of manufacturing operations were being performed on
aluminum, stainless steel, and titanium structures. Taking aluminum
as the base case, the objective of the experiment was to determine the
probable incremental labor costs involved in working the other two
materials for a representative sample of various types of manufacturing
operations. Armed with these types of data from the experiment, the
cost analysts were then in a position to devise techniques for adjusting
the historical data base (aluminum experience) so that it would be
more appropriate for dealing with the stainless steel airframe problem.
In visits to still other contractors' plants, the cost analysts found
that several were experimenting with the construction of stainless steel
honeycomb paneling. In sessions with the people conducting these
operations the cost analysts obtained a wealth of information (both
quantitative and qualitative) about how honeycomb cost might vary
with core cell size and shape, shape and size of the panel, number of
panel inserts, and the like. As a result, they were able to treat panels
as a special cost analysis problem and hence to improve considerably
their ability to estimate the cost of stainless steel airframes. The
expenditure of the time and travel budget on field work paid off well.
Summary Comment
Rather typically, cost analysts supporting a systems analysis activity
spend at least half their time struggling with the data and information
problem. In this section we have tried to convey some flavor of the
total problem and some notion of the types of techniques that may be
employed to solve it. Basically what is required is ingenuity, persistence,
and just plain hard work.
Summary
Systems analysis forms the central core of a program budgeting activity.
A vitally important part of systems analysis is a cost analysis capability
to generate estimates of the resource impact of alternative courses of
action being considered for the distant future.L
COMMENT
by EDWIN S. MILLS, Johns Hopkins University
Fisher's paper is a contribution to the large and growing literature on
cost analysis in the area of national security. There are two ways of
writing imaginatively on this subject. One may apply known techniques
to practical problems in an imaginative way, or one may introduce an
imaginative new technique. Unfortunately, I see neither in Fisher's
paper. The latter alternative might, for example, consist of the study of
a new production function and of related cost functions, or it might
consist of the derivation of a new programing algorithm. No such
innovations appear in Fisher's paper and he clearly views his mission
as falling within my former alternative. But a contribution of this sort
requires extensive empirical analysis so that one can use one's intuition
to invent new ways of measuring outputs, trade-offs among inputs, etc.
Almost all of Fisher's data are fictitious, and even the nature of the
problem is frequently unspecified, presumably for national security
reasons. The result is an impression of artificiality similar to the one
left by examples in many elementary price theory textbooks.
In the course of his paper, Fisher hints at a number of interesting
problems. My main criticism is that he stops the discussion at about
textbook level. In addition, although some of the problems have been
analyzed and partially solved in the literature, there is an annoying
lack of reference to the standard price theory literature in Fisher's
paper.
The rest of my comments refer to most of the significant problems
raised in Fisher's paper.
The first problem discussed in the section on cost analysis in prac-
tice is that of deciding whether cost should be calculated as a function
of the rate of output or of cumulative output. Although the former is
typically used by economists, the latter has been used in many studies
in operations research. Which is appropriate depends on the nature
of the situation, and it would have been interesting to have some
analysis of the conditions under which each is appropriate.
The second problem, discussed in connection with Figure 4, is that
of choosing between two productive processes C and D, when itis
uncertain how many units of either will be needed to achieve a cer-
tain output. Although the problem is a genuine one, Fisher contributesCost Functions and Budgets 263
Some of the principal characteristics of a systems cost analysis
capability are:
1. An explicit relationship between inputs and outputs, with a strong
emphasis on assessing the economic cost of alternative future out-
put-oriented program packages.
2. Explicit treatment of uncertainty.
3. Provision for dealing with scaling considerations.
4. Explicit treatment of problems associated with time.
5. A recognition of the importance of sensitivity analysis, contin-
gency analysis, and a fortiori argument.
6. Allocation of a substantial amount of time and effort to the con-
tinuous development and maintenance of an appropriate data
base.
Establishing and maintaining a cost analysis capability to support
systems analysis studies involves numerous difficulties. One of the
most troublesome is the data base problem.
Solution to parts of the data problem may be through major over-
haul of present formal information systems and through the establish-
ment of new complete enumeration systems. This, however, does not
appear feasible as a general solution—at least in the foreseeable
future.
Short of such major efforts are numerous alternative possibilities.
Some examples are:
1. Use of sampling techniques on an ad hoc basis.
2. Supplementing the existing historical data base by including esti-
mated data points for the near future.
3. Statistical manipulation of the existing data base.
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Introduction
This paper deals with one aspect of uncertainty in public investment
on which very little research has been done—the extent, nature, and
causes of error in estimating costs of public investment projects. Al-
though there is general agreement among public investment specialists
that cost estimates for project proposals typically fall short of actual
costs of projects when completed, this view is based upon fragmentary
information, often obtained from superficial comparison of project or
program documents and reports.1
There is no over-all reporting of cost experience for federal public
works; some reports of individual agency experience do exist, but much
of the information lies unassembled and unanalyzed in federal, state,
and local agency files. More significant for our purpose, even the
NOTE. Special thanks are due to the following for providing information and
valuable comments and suggestions on the subject of this paper: G. P. Palo,
Manager of Engineering Design and Construction, and members of his staff,
Tennessee Valley Authority; Wendell E. Johnson, Chief, Engineering Division,
Civil Works, Corps of Engineers, Department of the Army; Flarry Shooshan,
Deputy Undersecretary for Programs, U.S. Department of the Interior, and Blair
Bower, Resources for the Future, Inc.
'Cost as used throughout this paper is defined as the money cost of construc-
tion and installation of capital facilities of a public works proiect; it excludes
operation, maintenance and replacement costs. The definition does not include
opportunity cost considerations. This definition excludes interest during construc-
tion (except where otherwise noted) and, with this exception, corresponds to the
capital cost information collected by federal water-resource agencies and used
as inputs to benefit-cost analyses.268 TheAnalysis of Public Output
readily available information has not been analyzed in terms of the
extent, nature, and probable causes of difference between original I
estimates and final realized costs.
This paper makes only a small sortie into this largely unexplored
field. Time and resources restricted the search to only one sector of
U.S. federal investment—water-resource investment, by the Army
Corps of Engineers, Tennessee Valley Authority and Bureau of Rec-
lamation. The restricted scope of this study limits our ability to make
generalizations. It also points to the need for much additional research
on this aspect of public investment.
(
Extent of Previous Research f
t
Our admittedly sketchy search of sources revealed very little published
work on the cost question. This is true even in the field of water- t
resource investment, which has an extensive literature on benefit-cost
analysis. For example, of six major books on water-resource eco-
nomics,2 only Eckstein's (1958) gives more than cursory attention to
this questiqn, and his discussion is limited to Corps of Engineers cost
experience prior to Altouney made a limited analysis (1963)
of Bureau of Reclamation experience based on data collected by the
Bureau in Two of the most useful studies were concerned with
cost experience overseas. Healey analyzed 13 water control projects
built in India during the period while a Select Committee
on Nationalized Industries in Great Britain studied the cost experience
of the North of Scotland Hydro-Electric Board in constructing twenty- 4
fourhydroelectric power plants.6 A statistical study by two French
2 Otto Eckstein, Water-Resource Development: The Economics of Project I
Evaluation,Cambridge,1958; Roland McKean, EfficiencyinGovernment
Through Systems Analysis, with Emphasis on Water Resources Development,
New York, 1958; John Krutilla and Otto Eckstein, Multiple Purpose River De-
velopment, Studies in Applied Economic Analysis, Baltimore, 1958; Jack Hirsh-
leifer, James C. De Haven, and Jerome W. Milliman, Water Supply: Economics, C
Technology and Policy, Chicago, 1960; Arthur Maass et a!., Design of Water S
Resource Systems,Cambridge,Mass.,1962;Robert H. Haveman, Water
Resource Investment and the Public Interest, Nashville, 1965.
Eckstein, pp. 149—151. ii
Edward G. Altouney, The Role of Uncertainties in the Economic Evaluation
C
of Water Resources Projects, Institute in Engineering-Economic Systems, Stan- g
ford University, 1963.
5 J. M. Healey, "Errors in Project Cost Estimates," Indian Economic Journal, I
Vol. 12, July—September 1964.
6 Select Committee on Nationalized Industries, Report to the House of Com-
mons, Session Documents, Vol. 7, No. 304, 1956—57, London, H.M.S.O., 1957;